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CURRENT LEGISLATION
HOW FAULTLESS ARE THE NO-FAULT STATUTES/—
A STATE SURVEY
The recent enactment of no-fault automobile insurance statutes in
six states' reflects public dissatisfaction with the traditional system of
tort recovery for personal injuries sustained in automobile accidents.
Advocates of the no-fault concept maintain that a no-fault system of
compensation will reduce or eliminate the inefficiencies' and inequities°
characteristic of the fault system. The intent underlying the no-fault
concept is to provide adequate compensation for all victims of automo-
bile accidents. Coverage is usually afforded to the policyholder, mem-
bers of his family or household, guest passengers and pedestrians in-
jured by the insured vehicle' The policyholder's insurer directly com-
pensates the injured person, without determining who was at fault.° No-
fault thus changes the recovery system from one involving a third-party
adversary proceeding between the injured person and the allegedly
negligent party's insurance company to one assuring payment of first-
party benefits by the insured's company to persons covered by the in-
sured's policy. Proponents argue that the new system will reduce costs
of the recovery procedure' and that it will result in use of a greater
1
 Illinois-111. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, 11 600-13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971). Oregon—Ore.
Laws & Resolutions ch. 523, 11 1-12 (1971). Section 10 of this Act will amend Ore. Rev.
Stat. 1 731.418, and 1 11 will amend Ore. Rev. Stat. 1 743.786; 11 2-9 will be added to
11 743.786-.792. Florida—Fla. Sess. Laws ch. 252, 11 1-14 (1971). Delaware—Del. Code
Ann. tit. 21, 1 2118 (Supp. 1971). Massachusetts—Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, 11 34A,
34D, 34M, 34N; ch. 175,1¢ 22E-22H (formerly 1970 Act & Resolves ch. 670, 1 8), § 113B;
ch. 231, §6D (Supp. 1971). Puerto Rico—P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 9, 11 2051-65 (Supp. 1970).
South Dakota has also enacted a no-fault statute—S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. 11 58-23-6
to -8 (1971). The South Dakota law requires that no-fault coverage be offered only as
an optional supplement to the insured's regular motor vehicle liability insurance. It
requires that the optional coverage include first-party benefits for the death, loss of
earnings and medical expenses of both the insured and members of his household injured
in an automobile accident. The South Dakota law places no restrictions on the right to sue
and does not alter the traditional liability system. For this reason, the South Dakota
statute will not be discussed in this comment.
2 See R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim, 343-51
(1965) [hereinafter cited as R. Keeton & J. O'Connell].
3 See Hofstadter & Pesner, A National Compensation Plan for Automobile Accident
Cases, 22 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 615, 617-18 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hofstadter &
Pesner]; Keeton, Elimination of Fault Principle and Collateral Benefits: Keys to Basic
Protection, 3 Trial No. 6, at 15, 16 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Keeton] ; Moynihan, Are
We Ready for a Drastic Change?, 3 Trial No. 6, at 27, 28-29 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Moynihan],
4 R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 303, 388-91. This and the following
general statements in the text concerning no-fault protection are based on the Basic Pro-
tection Act proposed by Professors Keeton and O'Connell.
5 Id. at 308.
e Id. at 295-97. See Moynihan, supra note 3, at 28, for a discussion of the excessive
administrative costs of the fault system; but see Smith, Federal Automobile Insurance, 38
Ins. Coun. J. 413, 416 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
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proportion of the insured's premium dollar for compensatory benefits.'
As an incident of the assured payment of benefits, however, the
injured party, in most cases, is deprived of the common law right to
sue the person whose negligence may have caused the accident. 8 The
restriction of the right to sue in tort will purportedly reduce the num-
ber of automobile claims which presently overburden state and federal
courts.8
 It is further contended that, by restricting the right to sue for
general damages," no-fault plans will curtail the excessive compensa-
tory awards made by sympathetic juries, thereby indirectly decreasing
the costs of insurance.'l It is assumed that the reduction in costs will
be passed on to the insurance consumer, in the form of lower premiums.
This comment presents a comparative analysis of the major provi-
sions of recently enacted state no-fault statutes. These laws will be
evaluated in terms of their potential for achieving the major objectives
of no-fault insurance: (1) adequate compensation for all accident
victims; (2) reduction in the number of automobile tort claims; and
(3) reduction in premiums and the prompt payment of benefits.
I. ADEQUATE COMPENSATION
No-fault advocates contend that the present tort recovery system
fails to compensate certain victims of automobile accidents" and that it
either over- or undercornpensates others." In many accidents it is diffi-
cult and expensive to determine which party was at fault. In some, it is
clear that no one party alone was responsible for the injury.' Often, an
7
 Keeton, supra note 3, at 16-18. A New York State Insurance Department study
estimated that of the automobile insurance premium dollar presently paid, 44% is paid in
benefits to victims, 33% is used for 'overhead, and 23% is absorbed by the administrative
costs involved in adjusting claims, N.Y.S. Ins. Dep't, A Report: Automobile Insurance
. . . For Whose Benefit?, at 34-36 (1970). In contrast, 70% of the premium dollar for
workmen's compensation is paid to the injured person, and 82% of the premium dollar
for private life, health, and nonoccupational accident insurance is paid to the claimant.
See Note, The Massachusetts "No-Fault" Automobile Insurance Law: An Analysis and
Proposed Revision, 8 Harv. J. Legis. 455, 457-58 (1971).
8 R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 323-25.
0 Pinnick v. Cleary, — Mass: —, 271 N.E.2d 592, 602-04 (1971); R. Keeton &
J. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 13-15; Keeton, supra note 3, at 16; Moynihan, supra note 3,
at 30. But see Kemper, Keeton-O'Connell Plan: Reform or Regression? 3 Trial No. 6,
at 20, 22 (1967) ; Smith, supra note 6, at 419; Spangenberg, At What Price . . ., 3 Trial
No. 6, at 10, 11 (1970); cf. Pinnick v. Cleary, supra at 615-16 (Tauro, C.J. concurring).
10 R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 305, 324. For purposes of this comment
the term "general damages" will refer to intangible or noneconomic losses such as pain,
suffering and mental distress.
11 N.Y.S. Ins. Dep't, A Report: Automobile Insurance ... For Whose Benefit? at 108
(1970). But see Smith, supra note 6, at 416.
12 W. Prosser & Y. Smith, Cases And Materials On Torts 721 (4th ed. 1967) [herein-
after cited as W. Prosser & Y. Smith]; see Moynihan, supra note 3, at 29-30 for a
discussion of typical cases.
18 Hastings, Automobile Accident Reparations: No-Fault Plans and the Public In-
terest—Part II, 52 Chi. Bar Record 433, 437 (1971) ; Hofstadter & Pesner, supra note 3,
at 618; Keeton, supra note 3, at 16; Moynihan, supra note 3, at 28-29.
14 Pinnick v. Cleary, — Mass.'—, 271 N.E.2d 592, 606 n.17; W. Prosser & Y. Smith,
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accident is caused by a defective automobile," a road defect, hazardous
weather conditions, or other conditions beyond the control of either
driver. Frequently, the negligence of both drivers contributes to the
accident. In most jurisdictions, if a plaintiff cannot establish the de-
fendant's negligence as well as rebut the defense of contributory negli-
gence, his recovery is barred,'" and the plaintiff obtains no relief unless
he is able to collect under his own medical insurance coverage. 17
Critics of the tort recovery system believe that the adversary
nature of the traditional system often results in the overcompensation
of small claims and the undercompensation of large claims.'" An
insurance company will often settle small personal injury claims out of
court, even "padded" ones,'" in order to minimize administrative costs
and to avoid a larger award by a sympathetic jury.2° Conversely, a
company may prolong the recovery procedure for a large claim so that
a victim with substantial medical expenses and wage losses will exhaust
other sources of compensation and become anxious to settle out of
court—usually for an amount which will not adequately compensate
him for his losses."
In an attempt to correct these inequities; the no-fault statutes have
been designed to provide all accident victims with compensation for
medical expenses, for expenses incurred in procuring essential services
which the injured person would have performed for his household had
he not been injured, and for loss of earnings. The statutes establish
differing minimum amounts of no-fault coverage which an insurance
company must offer to compensate for these losses. Five state statutes
require payment of these benefits to all accident victims except certain
persons whom the legislatures have precluded from receiving no-fault
compensation because of their antisocial behavior: persons who inten-
supra note 12, at 721; Moynihan, supra note 3, at 28. But see Spangenberg, supra note 9,
at 11.
15
 Note, The Massachusetts "No-Fault" Automobile Insurance Law: An Analysis and
Proposed Revision, supra note 7, at 458. See generally Sales, Automobile Design Sufficiency
and Enhanced Injury: A New Concept for No-Fault Liability, 38 Ins. Coun. J. 388
(1971), for a discussion of the role that manufacturers of defective automobiles should
play in compensating accident victims.
15
 W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 423 (4th ed. 1971).
17
 In an attempt to mitigate the harshness of the contributory negligence doctrine,
fourteen states have enacted comparative negligence statutes. Similar legislation is pending
in twenty-one states. See Smith, supra note 6, at 420. Under a comparative negligence
statute, damages are awarded according to the percentage of fault attributed to each
party; the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is no longer an absolute defense.
W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, supra note 16, at 434-39.
15
 Hastings, supra note 13, at 437; Hofstadter & Pesner, supra note 3, at 618;
Keeton, supra note 3, at 16; Moynihan, supra note 3, at 28-29. For a discussion of the
disadvantages of the adversary recovery procedure vis-à-vis no-fault's first-party recovery
system, see Gillespie & MacKay, Florida's No-Fault Insurance Law, 45 Fla. B.J. 400, 402
(1971) and Moynihan, supra note 3, at 28.
19 Hastings, supra note 13, at 437; Keeton, supra note 3, at 16.
20 Keeton, supra note 3, at 16.
21 Hastings, supra note 13, at 437.
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tionally contribute to their injuries, operate a motor vehicle under the
influence of narcotics or alcohol, or operate a motor vehicle while com-
mitting certain crimes or fleeing lawful apprehension. 22
The statutes, however, differ considerably in the limitations placed
upon an accident victim's right to receive certain benefits. To prevent
double recovery, these limitations prohibit an injured person from
receiving no-fault benefits if he is entitled to receive compensation
from a collateral source of insurance. Consequently, a prudent insur-
ance purchaser with a collateral source will seek to avoid duplicate
coverage, but he can do so only if the statute with a collateral source
rule also provides for deductibles up to the amount of the minimum
required no-fault coverage." Absent such a provision, the purchaser
will be forced to pay for no-fault coverage of doubtful practical value
to him.
A. Specific Compensation Plans
1. Puerto Rico
The Puerto Rico no-fault statute was designed to establish a social
insurance system which would compensate all persons injured on the
roads of Puerto Rico, except those excluded for public policy reasons."
This system is mandatory and government-administered.' In compari-
son with the other no-fault statutes, the Puerto Rico law provides an
accident victim with what appears to be the greatest amount of no-
fault protection: unlimited medical benefits," certain fixed benefits
for dismemberment, disability, or death,' and weekly compensation,
subject to a dollar ceiling and time limitation, for fifty percent of earn-
ings lost." The statute also provides $500 for funeral expenses and
establishes death benefits for the dependents of the victim."
The most prominent feature of the plan is that it places no limits
22
 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73 § 602(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971) ; Ore. Laws & Resolutions
ch. 523,;; 5(1) (1971); Fla. Sess. Laws ch. 252,;i 7(2) (b) (1971); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 90, § 34A (Supp. 1971) ; P.R. LaWs Ann. tit. 9, 2055(3) (Supp. 1970). While not
expressly excluding members of the above mentioned categories, the Delaware statute
provides that "[Me coverage ... may be subject to conditions and exclusions customary
to the field of liability, casualty and property insurance . . . ." Del. Code Ann, tit. 21,
{ 2118(e) (Supp. 1971).
23 See p. 939 infra for a discussiOn of the deductible provision in the Massachusetts
no-fault statute.
24 Address by Mr. Frank W. Fournier, Executive Director of Puerto Rico Accident
Compensation Administration, at the; National No-Fault Conference in Dallas, Texas,
July 22-23, 1971.
25 Id. at 5.
20 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 9, § 2054(5) (Supp. 1970).
27 Id, 2054(2)-(3).
28 Id.* 2054(3) (a). Compensation for loss of earnings is provided by a weekly pay-
ment "equal to 50% of the injured's weekly salary at the time of the accident subject to a
maximum of $50 weekly for the first 52 weeks and 50% of his salary subject to a maxi-
mum of $25 weekly for 52 subsequent weeks." Id.
29 Id. § 2054(4).
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on an eligible victim's benefits for medical expenses." However, all
benefits payable under no-fault are reduced by the extent to which the
injured person is entitled to receive compensation from other insurance
sources:" unlike three of the other statutes," the Puerto Rico law has
a collateral source rule which applies to all no-fault compensation and
which is not limited to medical expenses or loss of earnings." Puerto
Rico's extensive no-fault coverage, then, is most beneficial for persons
having no other source of compensation and is of less value to those
who have a collateral source of personal injury insurance.
2. Massachusetts
The Massachusetts Personal Injury Protection Plan requires a
minimum no-fault coverage of $2,000 for (1) reasonable and neces-
sary medical expenses incurred within two years of the accident; (2)
loss of earnings up to a maximum of seventy-five percent of the in-
jured's average weekly salary for the year preceding the accident;
(3) amounts lost by reason of diminution of earning capacity of a
person temporarily unemployed at the time of the accident; and (4)
payments made to a person for performing essential services which
would have been performed by the victim but for the accident." Only
loss of earnings benefits are subject to a collateral source limitation."
If the injured person has a wage continuation policy, the loss of earn-
ings benefits payable under no-fault may not exceed an amount which,
together with the wage continuation benefits, would provide seventy-
five percent of the injured's weekly wages for the year preceding the
accident." The possible inequity that this rule may produce is limited
by a further provision, unique among existing state statutes, which
restores the unpaid no-fault benefits in case the injured person suffers
a later injury, after depleting the collateral source." Although the
30
 Id. § 2054(5).
81
 Id. § 2054(1) (b)-(c). The only benefits that will not be deducted from the amount
of no-fault compensation payable are those benefits received by the victim from his family
or friends and those received from life insurance, social security, or an inheritance estate.
Id. § 2054(1)(e).
82 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 600(e)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971); Fla. Sess. Laws ch.
252, § 7(4) (1971); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 34A (Supp. 1971).
33 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 9, § 2054(1)(b) (Supp. 1970).
84 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 34A (Supp. 1971). Persons entitled to receive
workmen's compensation benefits, however, are precluded from receiving any no-fault
payments. Id.
35 rd .
80 Thus under the Massachusetts plan the injured person receives loss of earnings
benefits from his no-fault policy only if his collateral source benefits do not provide him
with 75% of his average weekly wage for the preceding year. If his collateral source
benefits do provide 75%, he will not be eligible for no-fault compensation for loss of
earnings.
87 Id. However, the statute imposes a time limitation: the subsequent injury or illness
must occur within one year of the injured's receipt of the last no-fault benefit for the
previous automobile accident. Id.
This Massachusetts restoration rule operates as follows: if an injured party has wage
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collateral source rule affects only loss of earnings benefits, a further
provision allowing optional deductibles up to the amount of minimum
no-fault coverage" permits the insured to avoid duplicate coverage and
to reduce overall insurance costs.
The Massachusetts plan also includes "other vehicle" coverage;
which provides no-fault protection for policyholders and members of
their households when they are injured within Massachusetts in or by
an automobile not covered by no-fault insurance." The statute also
requires no-fault protection, through an assigned claims plan, for those
Massachusetts residents who are not owners or registrants of an auto-
mobile, or members of an owner's or registrant's household, or those
otherwise eligible to receive no-fault benefits under another person's
policy."
3. Florida
The Florida Reparations Reform Act requires a minimum no-
fault coverage of $5,000 per person for (1) reasonable expenses for
necessary medical services, (2) loss of earnings up to one hundred
percent of any loss of gross income, (3) loss of earning capacity, (4)
expenses for the procurement of essential household services which
the victim would have performed had he not been injured, and (5)
funeral expenses up to $1,000.41 The statute provides for optional
deductibles of $250, $500, and $1,000. 42 Florida has a limited collateral
losses due to a nonautomobile accident injury and is unable to recover from a wage
continuation collateral source because it was depleted at the time of an earlier automobile
accident, then he is eligible to receive no-fault benefits for the subsequent loss. The 75%
no-fault limitation on loss of earnings benefits also applies to this subsequent reimburse-
ment.
38 Id. § 34M.
89 Id. § 34A; Note, The Massachisetts "No-Fault" Automobile Insurance Law: An
Analysis and Proposed Revision, supra hate 7, at 467.
o Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 34N. Claims arising under this provision would be
assigned to one of the insurance companies issuing automobile insurance in Massachusetts.
Id.
In a recent decision by the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Grace v. Howlett,
Ch. No. 71-4737 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., decided Dec. 29, 1971), the Illinois no-fault statute
was held violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it
created arbitrary and discriminatory classifications of Illinois residents with respect to
their right to receive no-fault compensation. The court reasoned that since Illinois is not a
compulsory insurance state, some automobile owners do not insure their vehicles and
would therefore not be entitled to receive no-fault benefits unless injured as pedestrians
by an insured vehicle or as guest passengers in an insured vehicle. Persons who do not own
an automobile, the court noted, would also be able to receive first-party benefits only
under the above circumstances. Since 8 2 .4% of low-income blacks in Illinois either do not
own a car or own an uninsured automobile, the court held that the statute arbitrarily and
discriminatorily denied them no-fault compensation. The decision of the lower court was
affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court on March 23, 1972. See — Ill. — — N.E. 2d —
(1972). The inclusion in the Illinois statute of an assigned claims plan similar to that in
1 34N of the Massachusetts statute would presumably cure this constitutional defect.
41 Fla. Sess. Laws dr. 252, § 7(1) (1971).
42 Id. § 10.
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source rule which applies only to workmen's compensation and which
credits compensation benefits against no-fault payments to which the
injured would otherwise be entitled.' With a minimum no-fault cover-
age of $5,000 and a maximum deductible of $1,000, a Florida insured
may avoid only a fraction of the duplicate coverage to which he is sub-
ject if he has collateral personal injury insurance with $5,000 coverage.
Florida could eliminate the possibility of double recovery and dupli-
cate coverage by applying the collateral source rule to all no-fault
benefits and by offering optional deductibles up to the minimum
amount of no-fault coverage.
4. Oregon
The Oregon no-fault law requires the payment of the following
minimum no-fault benefits: (1) $3,000 per person for reasonable and
necessary medical expenses incurred within one year after the accident;
(2) if the person is employed, eighty-five percent of the loss of earnings
during the period from fourteen days after the accident to a time when
the injured party is able to return to his usual occupation; and (3) if
the injured is engaged in a nonremunerative occupation, all reasonable
expenses incurred for essential services which the victim would have
performed had he not been injured, until a time when he is reasonably
able to perform these services."
The Oregon collateral source provision permits guest passengers
and pedestrians to receive no-fault benefits in addition to collateral
source benefits" while requiring the insured and members of his family
to exhaust all collateral sources before receiving no-fault compensa-
tion." The distinction might be justified by the argument that an
insured who chooses to buy collateral insurance could take a deductible
equal to the minimum amount of no-fault coverage 47 and so avoid
duplication; a pedestrian or guest passenger, however, must secure
personal injury insurance without assuming that he would be covered
by an unknown driver's no-fault insurance. He does not have the option
of selecting a no-fault deductible. This justification fails, however,
since the Oregon statute allows an insurer to offer only a deductible
of up to $250." Hence the statute appears to discriminate against the
insured who must pay for benefits above $250 which will not be given
him if he has collateral insurance; while allowing guests and pedestrians
to receive double recovery.
48 Id. § 7(4). This is similar to the Massachusetts provision. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 90 § 34A (Supp. 1971).
94 Ore. Laws & Resolutions ch. 523 § 2(1)-(3) (1971).
45 Id. § 4(2).
46 Id. § 4(1).
47 See, for example, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90 § 34M (Supp. 1971).
45 Id.
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5. Delaware
The Delaware law requires minimum no-fault personal injury pro-
tection of $10,000 per person up to a maximum of $20,000 per acci-
dent." Benefits are paid for reasonable and necessary medical ex-
penses, loss of earnings, the procurement of essential services which
the injured would have performed," and funeral expenses up to a
limit of $2,000 per person.m The statute has no requirement that an
injured party exhaust his collateral sources of insurance before receiv-
ing no-fault benefits. The possibility of double recovery is thus pre-
served." The statute provides that the insured may select personal
injury deductibles applicable to himself and members of his house-
hold," although it does not establish specific amounts for the optional
deductibles. If insurers do 'offer deductibles equal to the minimum
amount of no-fault coverage, the Delaware statute would appear to be
an effective means of reducing duplicate coverage.
6. Illinois
The Illinois statute requires the following minimum no-fault pro-
tection: (1) $2,000 per perAon for medical expenses incurred within
one year of the accident; (2) eighty-five percent of the income lost as
a result of total disability caused by the accident, subject to a limit of
$150 per week for fifty-two 'weeks per person; and (3) expenses for
the procurement of essential services up to a limit of $12 per day for
365 days per person injured." The collateral source rule applies only to
workmen's compensation benefits." The statute is silent on the subject
of deductibles. If it is assumed that this silence precludes deductibles,
49 Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 2118(a) (2) (Supp. 1971).
59 Id.
51 Id .
52
 The Delaware statute, however, provides that the insurance company will be sub-
rogated to the rights of the injured party to the extent of the benefits paid to him.
Included in these subrogation rights are the victim's workmen's compensation claims.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 21 § 2118(f) (Supp. 1971). Apparently, then, an injured person would
make one complete recovery from the no-fault insurer and would allow the insurer to
pursue his workmen's compensation claim. If the company prevails in its claim, the
ultimate loss will be borne by workmen's compensation.
Unlike the Massachusetts statute which prohibits a person entitled to workmen's
compensation benefits from receiving any no-fault benefits, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90,
§ 34A (Supp. 1971), and unlike the Florida plan which requires that any workmen's
compensation benefits received by the victim be credited against the no-fault benefits he
would otherwise be entitled to receive, Fla. Sess. Laws ch. 252 § 7(4) (1971), the Dela-
ware statute allows the injured party to make full recovery up to the limits of the no-fault
coverage and so assures the victim prompt and expeditious recovery. Although this
provision is not denominated a collateral source rule, it has the same effect with respect
to workmen's compensation.
55 Del. Code Ann. tit. 21 § 2118(a) (2) (B) (Supp. 1971).
b4 III. Stat. Ann. ch. 73, § 600(a) (1)-(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971).
55 Id. § 600(e) (2).
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the prudent driver who has collateral insurance will not be able to
avoid duplicate coverage."
B. Recommended Improvements
Massachusetts, Oregon, and Florida—states that have relatively
low limits on the minimum mandatory no-fault coverage—should con-
sider raising these limits so that greater assured benefits would be avail-
able and so that more persons would be totally compensated for their
specific losses without having to litigate. These objectives; however,
must be balanced against the equally important goal of minimizing the
costs of automobile insurance premiums. Considering the experimental
nature of the initial no-fault plans, , the $10,000 minimum no-fault
coverage required by the Delaware statute appears to be a reasonable
compromise. Without raising premium costs excessively, this amount
of protection would provide adequate benefits for most victims and
would compensate for a substantial percentage of the specific damages
incurred by seriously injured persons. Another improvement would be
obtained by subjecting payments for the procurement of essential
services to a percentage limitation similar to that placed on loss of
earnings benefits by the Massachusetts, Oregon, and Illinois statutes;
such limitations presumably discourage malingering and so reduce
costs. Finally, states considering no-fault legislation should seriously
examine the "other vehicle" coverage" and the assigned claims provi-
sion of the Massachusetts statute, a provision that assures no-fault
compensation to all Massachusetts residents injured in that state in or
by a vehicle not covered by no-fault insurance."
Collateral source provisions may decrease the costs of automobile
insurance, but they do so by passing on to other types of insurance
much of the cost of compensating victims of automobile accidents.
Presumably, then, the cost of such insurance will increase. Accord-
ingly, a statute having a collateral source rule should offer, as does the
Massachusetts statute, an adequate deductible in order that an insured
will not be required to pay for coverage the benefits of which he will
not be entitled to receive."
II. REDUCTION IN AUTOMOBILE TORT CLAIMS: RESTRICTIONS ON
THE RIGHT TO SUE
Proponents of the no-fault concept contend that the new system
would eliminate many automobile tort cases which purportedly are
overburdening the state and federal court systems. No-fault statutes
attempt to accomplish this objective by restricting an injured party's
88 This problem would be alleviated if deductibles up to the amount of minimum
no-fault coverage were allowed. '
37 See p. 940, especially note 39 supra.
68 See discussion of the Grace decision, note 40 supra.
69 Even when a statute lacks a collateral source rule, it would seem advisable to
provide a deductible large enough so that an insured may choose to avoid duplicate
coverage, thereby reducing his overall insurance costs.
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access to the court in several ways. First; an injured party may be
precluded from maintaining a tort action for any specific loss damages'
which he is entitled to recover as first-party benefits under no-fault
coverage 81
 A statute which provides for an unlimited or a significant
amount of first-party benefiti would substantially reduce the number
of personal injury tort suits. Second, suits for general damages' may
be entirely forbidden or else they are permitted only in clearly specified
situations where equity considerations outweigh the value of elimi-
nating tort recovery for general damages. Statutes in the latter category
either specify certain bodily injuries which entitle an injured person
to sue for general damages,', or they adopt a threshold approach by
making the right to sue for general damages depend upon the amount
of specific damages." Some statutes adopt both methods. By increasing
the statutory threshold for general damage actions, a legislature may
preclude more tort actions, thereby effecting a needed reduction in
court congestion.
A. Specific Restrictions on the Right to Sue
1. Puerto Rico
Although the Puerto RiCo statute provides for unlimited medical
expense coverage and for numerous other benefits, it does not com-
pletely eliminate tort liability! An injured party may sue if his general
damages for pain and suffering exceed $1,000, or if his specific damages
exceed $2,000." However, the incentive to sue is presumably dimin-
ished by a requirement that stipulated deductions be taken from any
court judgment. This provision requires a $1,000 deduction from a
general damage judgment, and, from a specific damage award, either a
$2,000 deduction or a deduction equal to the amount of no-fault bene-
fits received by the victim if that amount exceeds $2,000." It appears
unlikely that a person would go to the expense and effort of suing for
general damages unless his injury were substantial and he felt confident
60 For purposes of this comment,Ispecific Toss damages refer to those damages involv-
ing actual economic loss. These do not include general damages for pain, suffering and
mental distress.
61 FIa. Sess. Laws ch. 252 § 8(1) (1971) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 34M
(Supp. 1971) ; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 9, § 2058 (1)-(2) (Supp. 1970).
62 See the definition of general damages, note 10 supra.
6° Fla. Sess. Laws ch. 252, § 8(2) (1971). This section preserves the right to sue for
general damages when the injured paity incurs permanent disfigurement, a fracture to a
weight-bearing bone, a fracture with certain stipulated complications, loss of a body
member, permanent injury, permanent loss of a bodily function, or death. The Massa-
chusetts provision, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 60 (Supp. 1970), preserves the
right to sue for pain and suffering when the injury causes a permanent and serious dis-
figurement, a fracture, loss of a body member, loss of sight or hearing, or death.
84 FIa. Sess. Laws ch. 252 § 8(2) (1971); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 6D
(Supp. 1971) ; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 9, § 2058(2) (Supp. 1970).
65 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 9 § 2058(2) (a)-(b) (Supp. 1970) ; Address by Mr. Frank W.
Fournier, supra note 24, at 6.
60 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 9, § 2058(3) (a)-(c) (Supp. 1970).
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of proving pain and suffering damages considerably in excess of the
mandatory $1,000 deduction. In this respect then, the Puerto Rico
statute serves to discourage nuisance suits for pain and suffering and
consequently should serve to relieve court congestion.
2. Massachusetts and Florida
The Massachusetts and Florida statutes theoretically are similar
in the restrictions that they place on the right to sue. The Massachu-
setts statute provides for a minimum no-fault coverage of $2,000; with
a corresponding tort liability exemption:37 However, the Massachusetts
plan allows suits for pain and suffering if special damages exceed a
$500 threshold in medical expenses, or in cases of specified serious in-
juries or death 98
 The Florida statute is more restrictive. It exempts
tort liability up to the $5,000 limit of first-party no-fault benefits °p It
also adopts a threshold approach by permitting tort actions for general
damages only when medical expenses exceed $1,000," or when the vic-
tim dies or incurs specified injuries 71 The higher thresholds required
by the Florida plan should reduce the number of tort suits brought to
trial and the number of overcompensatory pain and suffering awards,
a reduction that should in turn lower insurance costs. Finally, the lower
Massachusetts threshold of $500 in medical expenses could easily be
reached by visiting expensive doctors or hospitals. While the same ar-
gument may be made against the Florida threshold, it is obviously
more difficult to "boost" medical expenses to $1,000 than to $500.
The effectiveness of the Florida statute in reducing court conges-
tion, however; is still unnecessarily limited. The statute allows an
insurance company to maintain a tort action against an allegedly neg-
ligent party if it has paid no-fault benefits to a victim who is entitled
to sue such party and who fails to do so within one year after the last
payment of no-fault benefits." A provision requiring Florida insurers
to submit such claims to intra-industry arbitration would remove these
insurers' suits from the courts while simultaneously preserving the in-
surance companies' right to reimbursement. Under such an arbitration
requirement, insurers would be allowed to bring to court only claims
against parties not covered by a Florida no-fault policy.
The Massachusetts statute includes a provision which allows in-
surers to be subrogated to the rights of the insured, to the extent that
they pay no-fault benefits to him." The insurers can sue an allegedly
negligent party who is not exempt from tort liability, that is, an un-
insured or out-of-state motorist. If the allegedly negligent party is
67 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1971).
es Id. at ch. 231, § 6D. For a list of the specified injuries, see note 62 supra.
69 Fla. Sess. Laws ch. 252, § 8(1) (1971).
76 Id. § 8(2).
71 Id. For a list of the specified injuries, see note 62, supra.
72 Fla. Sess. Laws ch. 252 § 7(3)(d) (1971). The insurer's recovery is limited to the
amount of benefits it has paid to the injured party. Id.
78 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1971).
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exempted from tort liability because he is covered by a Massachusetts
no-fault policy, the insurers are required to submit claims against such
persons to intra-industry arbitration. 74
 In arbitration, the insurer whose
insured would be liable in tort but for his exemption is required to
reimburse the other insurer to the extent of the no-fault payments
made to the victim." The arbitration requirement thus keeps many
of the insurers' claims out of the courts.
3. Illinois
Although the Illinois statute provides for payment of first-party
benefits up to a limit of $9,800,78
 it allows an injured person to sue
for all losses not recoverable as no-fault benefits, including pain and
suffering." However, the Initials plan has a provision; unique among
the state statutes, which restricts the amount that may be awarded in
a suit for pain and suffering. It limits a general damages award to a
sum equal to fifty percent of the injured's medical expenses under $500
plus one hundred percent of any medical expenses over $500. 78 By
such limitations the statute discourages minor suits for pain and suffer-
ing7° while allowing a person with substantial specific losses to recover
general damages up to an amount equal to his medical expenses minus
$250 (fifty percent of the first $500 in medical expenses).
The Illinois plan has another unique provision regarding tort
claims. It requires mandatory arbitration for all automobile accident
claims of $3,000 or less" for minor injuries or property damage. Ac-
74 Id.
75 Id.
75
 III. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 600(a)(1)-(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971). Under the
minimum required no-fault coverage, if the injured party was employed at the time of the
accident, the maximum benefits available to him would be $9,800—$2,000 for medical
expenses and $7,800 ($150 per week ftir 52 weeks) for loss of earnings benefits. If the
victim was not a wage-earner, the maximum amount payable would be $2,000 for medical
expenses and $4,380 ($12 per day for 365 days) for the procurement of essential services.
Id.
77
 Id. § 604; Vaccarello, Improved Automobile Reparations—An Answer to "Total
No-Fault," 59 Ill. B.J. 801, 812 (1971).
78
 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 608(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971). This section was noted
by the court in Grace, supra note 40; for the discriminatory effect it would have on
residents of low-income areas. The court determined that by making the amount of
general damages recoverable depend upon the amount of medical expenses incurred, this
provision would discriminate against injured persons living in low-income areas, since they
would incur lower hospital and doctor expenses than persons with a similar injury living
in areas with a higher standard of living. Consequently, the court found that this section
denied equal protection, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The statute, however, makes an exception to the § 608(a) limitations on pain and
suffering awards. It provides that in cases of "death, dismemberment, permanent total or
permanent partial disability and permanent serious disfigurement" there are to be no
restrictions on the amount of general damages. Id. 608(c).
79 The court in Grace, supra note 40, found that the restrictions on general damages
made it inexpedient to maintain a court action in over 90% of the automobile accident
cases in Illinois. Thus restrictions on pain and suffering damage awards would apparently
have a substantial effect on reducing court congestion.
80
 III. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 609. The Illinois Department of Insurance modeled the
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cess to the court is allowed only on appeal from the arbitration deci-
sion.81
 This provision will undoubtedly help to reduce the number of
automobile tort suits.
4. Oregon and Delaware
The Oregon and Delaware no-fault statutes appear to place the
fewest restrictions on the right to sue. Although the Oregon statute
provides for first-party benefits, it places no restrictions on the injured
party's right to sue for either specific or general damages. Presumably,
however, a victim who receives prompt payment of no-fault benefits
will be satisfied with that compensation and will not undertake judicial
action against an allegedly negligent party. In Oregon, as in Massachu-
setts, if both parties involved in the accident are insured by companies
authorized to provide no-fault insurance in that state, the insurer whose
insured is or would be held legally liable must reimburse the other
insurer for the first-party benefits it has paid.82 If there is a disputed
claim, the insurers are required to submit the claim to arbitration."
By preventing insurance companies from suing the allegedly negligent
party or his insurer, the mandatory arbitration requirement should
help to reduce court congestion.
Although the Delaware statute places a high ceiling on no-fault
arbitration requirement in the Illinois no-fault law on a similar requirement adopted by
the Municipal Court of Philadelphia pursuant to Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 30 (Supp. 1971).
The success of the Philadelphia program was noted in a report by the Illinois Department
of Insurance, which indicated:
On February 17, 1958, the Municipal Court of Philadelphia installed mandatory
arbitration for all cases in which the amount in controversy was under $2,000
(last year [1970] the limit was raised to $3,000). Prior to 1958, a backlog of
cases had built up, causing trial delays of 24 to 30 months. From 1958 through
1967, this system of arbitration resulted in the disposition of more than 60,000
cases while the waiting period for a regular trial was reduced to three months.
By 1968, the delay was reduced so significantly that it became possible to obtain
a trial in 30 days.
Ill. Dep't of Ins., A Report: Auto Reparations in Illinois—The Illinois Plan, 26 (1971).
The continued success of the Philadelphia program is evidenced by a recent change allow-
ing arbitration, on a voluntary basis, for claims between $3,000 and $10,000. Smith, supra
note 6, at 419. Parties involved in the arbitration cases appear to be satisfied with this
procedure; the results from concluded cases indicate that after arbitration fewer than five
percent of the cases were appealed and only a small percentage of those were actually
tried. Ill. Dep't of Ins., supra at 27. The constitutionality of the Philadelphia arbitration
program was upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Application of Smith, 381 Pa.
223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955). The court stated that certain minimum due process safeguards
had been guaranteed and that the availability of an appeal permitted reasonable conditions
to be imposed on a litigant's right to a jury trial. Id. at 230-33, 112 A.2d at 629-31.
81 DI. Ann. Stat. eh. 73, § 609(g) (1)-(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp, 1971).
82 Ore. Laws & Resolutions ch. 523, § 7(1) (1971).
88 Id. If a victim injured by a person not covered by an Oregon no-fault policy
brings a tort action against such a person, the insurer is entitled to reimbursement from
the proceeds of any settlement or judgment the injured party receives. If the injured party
does not sue on his own initiative, he may be required by the insurer to bring an action
against the alleged tortfeasor in order to recover the amount of benefits paid by the
insurer to the injured party. These provisions apply to general health and personal injury
insurance companies as well as to no-fault insurers. Id. I 8(1)-(4).
947
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
benefits, those generous provisions may not effectively reduce court
claims. There are no express restrictions on suits for pain and suffer-
ing, and an injured person is allowed to sue for any specific damages
which he did not receive from the no-fault coverage." Presumably,
however, he will be content with the no-fault compensation and will
not bother to sue unless his injuries are substantial and his chances
of being awarded a substantial pain and suffering recovery are good.
Moreover, the Delaware statute provides that an insurer will be sub-
rogated to the rights of a person receiving first-party benefits to the
extent of the benefits it has provided." To enforce its subrogation
rights, an insurer is allowed to maintain an action for damages against
the alleged tortfeasor." Although the statute requires arbitration by
insurers of certain property damage claims, 87
 it does not provide for
arbitration of personal injury claims. If insurers do not voluntarily
submit personal injury claims to arbitration, the number of tort claims
being brought to court in Delaware will not be lessened substantially.
An arbitration requirement could easily remedy this disadvantageous
aspect of the statute.
B. Recommended Restrictions on the Right to Sue
It is clear that a high level of minimum no-fault coverage and a
correspondingly high level of tort liability exemption would preclude
most tort suits for specific damages. Greater restrictions on the right
to sue for general damages would reduce the costs of liability insurance
by eliminating the possibility of excessive pain and suffering awards.
Pursuit of these objectives, however, must be balanced by the consid-
eration that a person who genuinely suffers substantial pain and men-
tal anguish ought to be compensated for his suffering. It is submitted
that a statutory stipulation of certain serious injuries which, if incur-
red, would allow a victim to sue for general damages would best ac-
commodate these competing considerations. A $1,000 medical expense
threshold on other suits for pair and suffering, similar to that imposed
by Florida, appears to be an appropriate restriction on suits for gen-
eral damages. In addition, thei right of insurers to sue for specific
damages should be restricted by a mandatory intra-industry arbitra-
tion requirement.
III. CONSUMER BENEFITS
A. Rediiced Premiums
The no-fault concept is in many respects consumer-oriented. One
benefit offered to all policyholders by several of the existing statutes
84 The injured party cannot recover damages for no-fault benefits which he would
have received had he not chosen a deductible. Del. Code Ann. fit. 21, § 2118(g) (Supp.
1971).
88 Id. § 2118(0.
88 Id. § 2118(g).
87 Id. 2118(i). If the owner of a damaged vehicle other than that of the insured
requests arbitration of a property damage claim, the insurance company must comply.
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is a required reduction in automobile insurance premiums. Puerto Rico,
Massachusetts and Florida have taken substantial steps to reduce in-
surance costs. Puerto Rico has sought to accomplish this objective by
having the government rather than private insurance companies admin-
ister the no-fault system." The statute provides that the "cost of this
insurance shall be distributed among all the motor vehicle owners
through an annual contribution to be paid at the time of registering
the vehicle."" The original no-fault act had set the annual contribu-
tion at $35.90
 A subsequent amendment in 1969 reduced this cost to
$17.50 per vehicle."
In Massachusetts the no-fault statute had provided for a manda-
tory fifteen percent reduction in premiums for personal injury no-fault
protection as well as for all other types of motor vehicle insurance."
However, the insurance companies in Massachusetts challenged the
mandated premium reductions for property damage insurance, which
was to remain on a fault liability basis. In Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance," the Supreme Judicial Court held
that the premium reductions in property damage liability insurance
were confiscatory and therefore unconstitutional." The court found
that if the reductions were allowed, the insurance companies would
collect less in premiums than they would have to pay out as compen-
sation for property damage losses and as overhead expenses. The court
based its decision on the insurance companies' estimate that in 1971
the frequency of accidents and the companies' operational expenses for
property damage insurance would remain the same as in 1969, but
that the average cost of property damage claims would increase by
7.2 percent per year from 1969 to 1971." Subsequently, in Employers
Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance," the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the required premium
reductions for fire, theft, and collision insurance were also confiscatory
and therefore unconstitutional.
Judicial decisions have thus negated the Massachusetts statute's
obligatory reduction in premiums for those types of motor vehicle in-
surance not altered by the no-fault statute. However, the insurance
88
 The Puerto Rico plan eliminates several administrative expenses in that it does not
require underwriting, the issuance of policies, billing, or the collection of premiums.
Address by Mr. Frank W. Fournier, Executive Director of Puerto Rico Accident Compen-
sation Administration, at the National No-Fault Conference in Dallas, Texas, July 22-23,
1971.
89
 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 9 § 2064(1) (Supp. 1970).
00
 Act of June 26, 1968, No. 138 § 14.
91 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 9, § 2064(2) (Supp. 1970).
92 Act of Aug. 13, 1970, ch. 670 6, Mass. Acts & Resolves Adv. Sh. 633.
93 - Mass. —, 263 N.E.2d 698 (1970).
94
 Id. at —, 263 N.E.2d at 704.
95 Id. at —, 263 N.E.2d at 700. If the mandated 15% reduction in property damage
rates were allowed, the companies together would incur an underwriting loss of $34,699,100
for 1971. Id.
98
 Equity No. 69,826 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Suffolk County, 1970).
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industry did not challenge the mandated premium reduction for the
personal injury protection; which was substantially altered by the no-
fault statute. Presumably, no challenge was made because the average
cost of personal injury claims,. unlike the cost of property damage
claims, was expected to decrease. This decrease was expected to result
from a reduction in both compensation for pain and suffering and in
the administrative and legal costs of handling personal injury claims
under the no-fault plan. If these expectancies are not borne out by
April, 1972, when authoritative, reports on 1971 accident claims will
be available, the insurance companies could request rate increases in
order to meet their higher-than-anticipated costs. Preliminary reports
indicate, however, that the insurance companies' costs are substantially
lower under no-fault than they were under the tort liability system."
In addition to its provision requiring rate reductions for all policy-
holders, the Massachusetts statute requires that the Commissioner of
Insurance establish "reasonable . discounts' for a policyholder when
neither he nor any member of this household has been involved in a
reportable accident during the past year." A reasonable discount is
statutorily presumed to be two percent for each year without a re-
portable accident."° These discounts would appear to be an effective
means of encouraging safe driving as well as a decided benefit for
certain safe motorists." Although the annual discount percentage is
small, the discounts are cumulative," so that a policyholder who
maintains an accident-free record for a considerable number of years
would be entitled to substantially reduced insurance premiums.
The Massachusetts no-fault statute also affords certain policy-
01
 Insurance costs for personal injury coverage were reduced by 42% after one year
under the Massachusetts no-fault plan. Apparently this was due to a reduction in both
the number and the amount of personal injury claims. The number of personal injury
claims decreased by approximately 48%; during the first 9 months of 1971, and the av-
erage cost of these claims dropped by 61% in the same time period. Boston Globe, Feb. 6,
1972, at 32, col. 2.
99 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 113B (Supp. 1971).
99 Id. The statute also requires the Commissioner to set higher rates for those persons
convicted of a moving motor vehicle violation. Id.
100 Id. The Massachusetts no-fault statute also presumes that "reasonable surcharges"
for drivers shall be (1) 100% for each conviction of driving under the influence of liquor
or narcotic or hallucinogenic drugs; (2) :20% for each speeding conviction; and (3) 10%
for each conviction for any other moving violation. Id. Through private insurance com-
panies the law here applies a civil penalty to a criminal act as a means of deterring motor
vehicle violations. While it imposes a 100% surcharge for major criminal infractions, it
grants only an annual 2% reward for accident-free drivers.
101 However, a provision offering premium reductions under a no-fault system may
be inequitable in that policyholders who are not necessarily unsafe or poor drivers but
are merely unfortunate enough to be involved in an accident are denied discounts. A
provision awarding substantially lower premiums to accident-free drivers may have a
negative effect on the practical value of a no-fault policy to the individual insured.
Recognizing that he would forfeit a preMium reduction to which he would otherwise have
been entitled, a policyholder involved in an accident would perhaps hesitate to submit
a claim for injuries he has sustained.
102 Id.
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holders the assurance of automatic policy renewal.ce' The motor ve-
hicle insurance policy of a person sixty-five years or older must be
renewed unless the insured (1) has been fraudulent in applying for
the insurance; (2) has been found guilty of a moving motor vehicle
violation; (3) has had his driver's license or registration revoked or
suspended for more than thirty days; (4) has become ineligible for
discounts because of accident involvement; (5) has failed to pay his
premiums; or (6) has been convicted of operating a motor vehicle un-
der the influence of liquor or narcotics. 104 If an insurer legally refuses
to renew the policy of a person sixty-five or older, it must give the
insured thirty days' notice of such refusal and the reasons therefor."'
If an insurer refuses to renew the policy of a person under sixty-five for
any reason other than those for which it can refuse renewal to persons
sixty-five or older, the company must accept one additional assigned
risk for each refusal."° Persons who have been accident-free for two
consecutive years, and who have thereby earned a four-percent dis-
count in their premiums, are afforded the most protection. An insurer
may refuse to renew such a person's policy only in the case of fraud
or nonpayment of premiums."'
The Florida statute requires that the 1972 rates for all required
coverage, that is, no-fault coverage plus the present financial respon-
sibility coverage, be reduced by at least fifteen percent of the total
premiums for the prior financial responsibility coverage. 105 Thus, if
a policyholder had liability coverage greater than that required by
the financial responsibility law, the reduction would not apply to the
portion of his premium attributable to the excess coverage. 109
 In addi-
tion, the cost of adding no-fault protection to the required financial
responsibility coverage will negate at least part of the savings from
the fifteen percent reduction."° Unlike the Massachusetts statute, the
Florida no-fault law expressly recognizes the possibility that mandated
premium reductions may result in inadequate rates and may eventu-
ally lead to the insolvency of the insurance companies.'" An insurer
103
 The statute provides that no insurer may fail to issue or renew any motor vehicle
policy on the basis of age, sex, race, occupation or place of garaging the vehicle. Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175 § 22E (Supp. 1971). This provision guarantees automobile in-
surance to residents of areas experiencing high accident rates.
104 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 22E (Supp. 1971),
105 Id.
106 Id, § 22G.
107 Id. § 22F,
108 Fla. Sess. Laws ch. 252 § 12(2)(a.) (1971), It appears that not every policyholder
is guaranteed a 15% reduction in premiums. Rather, the statute merely requires every
insurer to lower its rates so that the net effect is an overall 15% reduction in premiums.
Gillespie & MacKay, Florida's No-Fault Insurance Law, 45 Fla. B.J. 400, 401-02.
100
 Biddle, No-Fault Just No So, Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 14, 1971, at 10-D, col. 3.
110 Id. For example, if the premium cost for the basic financial responsibility cover-
age were $100, the 15% reduction would bring the premium cost down to $85. However,
the cost of the no-fault coverage must be added to the $85, thus negating at least part
of the required 15% reduction.
111 Fla. Sess. Laws ch. 252, § 12(2)(a) (1971).
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so jeopardized may file with the Commissioner of Insurance a request
for higher rates, accompanied by evidence that the rates required by
the no-fault act are inadequate.'" Because the Florida no-fault statute
provides this administrative remedy to an insurer who maintains that
the mandated rates may be too low to cover his compensation costs
and operational expenses, it seems improbable that Florida insurers
will challenge the required reductions.
B. Prompt Payment
Another major objective of no-fault is to assure prompt payment
of benefits by the insurance company to those injured persons included
under the no-fault coverage. Although the Delaware, Oregon and Puerto
Rico statutes are silent on the subject, the other plans have various
provisions to assure prompt payment. The Massachusetts statute pro-
vides that personal injury benefits are "due and payable as loss ac-
crues . . . but an insurer may agree to a lump sum discharging all
future liability for such benefits on its own behalf and on behalf of
the insured."1" If the payments are not made within thirty days; the
unpaid person has the right to' bring an action in contract against the
insurer for the amount of the unpaid benefits."'
The Florida no-fault statute also requires that payments be made
within thirty days after written notice to the company, unless the com-
pany has reasonable proof that it is not responsible for the payment
of the benefits.115 If an injured person chooses at a particular time to
make a claim for only part of his total loss, the thirty-day requirement
applies to that partial claim as well as to any subsequent partial
claims.'" The Florida statute also provides that "all overdue payments
shall bear simple interest at the rate of ten percent . . . per annum."'"
By providing a substantial financial penalty for delays in payment,
the statute exerts pressure on the insurance companies to pay the
benefits promptly. Moreover, it appears that the insurer is not relieved
of its responsibility to make prompt payment if the victim brings an
action against an allegedly negligent party."'
The Illinois statute requires that benefits be paid every thirty
days even though the expenses incurred may continue over a greater
112 Id. Otherwise an insurer may not increase the rates for the mandatory coverage
before Jan. 1, 1973. Id.
118 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1971).
114 Id. The strength of the prompt payment requirement is diminished, however, by
an allowance afforded the insurance company when the injured person brings a tort action
for injuries sustained in an accident outside Massachusetts. In such a situation, the duty
of the insurer to make payment as losses accrue is suspended until a settlement is made
or a final judgment is awarded. Id.
115 Fla. Sess. Laws ch. 252, 7(4)(b) (1971).
110 Id. Insurers are required to pay disability benefits to entitled victims at least
every two weeks. Id. § 7(1)(b).
117 Id. I 7(4)(c).
118 Id. § 7(3)(a). This section does not allow insurers to suspend payment of benefits
when the injured party brings a tort action.
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period of time.'" If an insurer fails to meet the requirement of prompt
payment, the injured person may bring an action in contract to recover
the unpaid benefits. 12° The Illinois statute gives the injured party le-
verage against a delinquent insurance company by requiring a treble
damage award if the company willfully refused to make the required
payment on time.'" In addition, the Illinois plan specifically provides
that "the existence of a potential cause of action in tort by the recipient
of the benefits . . . does not obviate the company's obligation to
promptly pay such benefits." 122
 Thus the injured person is assured
of compensation for his losses while he awaits the outcome of any
judicial action he may pursue.'28
The Illinois statute also has a unique provision which may have
a substantial impact on all automobile insurance claims in the state.
The statute provides that in any action against an alleged tortfeasor,
the defendant's insurance company may offer or make advance pay-
ments to the injured plaintiff.'" In order to further encourage advance
payments, the statute stipulates that in any judicial proceeding "any
evidence of or concerning . . . advance payment[s] is not admissible
in evidence or may not be construed as an admission of liability
. . . ."125
 In drafting this section, the Illinois Department of Insurance
contemplated that the advance payments provision would encourage
insurance companies to make both property damage and bodily injury
advance payments.12° When a party is not ready to settle or to present
a final claim for bodily injuries sustained in the same accident, the
property damage advance payments are quite helpful. The advance
payment provision for bodily injury would allow a seriously injured
person to procure rehabilitative treatment when he most needs it,
rather than forcing him to wait for the outcome of a tort suit. Fur-
thermore, victims receiving advance payments will not be forced to
exhaust their personal savings or to incur debts while awaiting a final
judgment.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most formidable obstacle to the enactment of no-fault
statutes has been the traditional legal principle that an individual
should pay for the injurious consequences of his own negligence. In
contrast, the no-fault plans reflect the notion that the motoring public
110 Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 73 § 603(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971).
120 Id. If the victim prevails in the court action, the insurer must pay the insured
party's reasonable attorney's fees. Id.
121 Id.
122
 Id. § 603(a). If the victim prevails in the tort action, he must reimburse the
insurer for those no-fault benefits paid by the insurer.
123
 This approach appears to be preferred over that of the Massachusetts statute,
which suspends payment until the outcome of litigation arising from an accident outside
Massachusetts is finally determined.
124
 Id. § 607(a).
125 M. Stat. Ann. ch. 73 I 607(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971),
126 Ill
. Dep't of Ins., supra note 79, at 22.
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as a whole rather than the individual motorist should pay for the
injuries caused through the use of motor vehicles.' Now that several
states have adopted the no-fault concept,'" the future of no-fault will
depend on the success that the statutes will have in correcting the
failures and inequities of the tort recovery system.
While no single existing state no-fault statute provides a panacea
for the problems associated with automobile accident reparations; sev-
eral have provisions which could achieve some of the major no-fault
objectives. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of these provisions is often
undermined by other provisions which may directly counteract the
reformative impact of the strong provisions or which merely fail to
have any positive effect themselves in achieving no-fault goals. Such
contrasts in the statutes reflect a series of compromises reached by
the insurance industry, bar associations, and consumer groups, com-
promises resulting from the state legislative process, which subjects
members of legislatures to strong pressures from lobbyists for these
interest groups. 129 As more state legislatures consider enacting no-fault
plans, it would be wise for them to recognize the weaknesses in the
existing statutes and to make future no-fault legislation more than a
series of compromises.
EDITH N. DINNEEN
127 Hofstadter & Pesner, A National Compensation Plan for Automobile Accident
Cases, 22 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 615, 616, 619 (1967). The rationale behind this view
appears to be that the automobile claim should be differentiated from the generic tort
since the former arises from a societal problem while the latter is primarily an inter-
personal controversy. This distinction is borne out by the special legislative treatment
given the automobile since its inception. Id. at 616.
128 In addition, indications are that at least 30 states will consider no-fault legislation
during 1972. Boston Globe, Feb. 13, 1972, at 53, col. 2.
129 Dukakis, Legislators Look at Proposed Changes, 1967 Ill. L.F. 582, 587-90. For
example, legislators are often unfamiliar with the complex problems of insurance law
and must therefore rely on the apparent expertise of the insurance committees, which are
usually affiliated with the insurance industry. Id. at 586-87.
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